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SUBFEDERAL IMMIGRATION
REGULATION AND THE TRUMP EFFECT
HUYEN PHAM† & PHAM HOANG VAN‡
The restrictive changes made by the Trump presidency on U.S. immigration policy
have been widely reported: the significant increases in both interior and border
enforcement, the travel ban prohibiting immigration from majority-Muslim coun-
tries, and the decision to terminate the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA) program. Beyond the traditional levers of federal immigration control,
this administration has also moved aggressively to harness the enforcement power
of local and state police to increase interior immigration enforcement. To that end,
the administration has employed both voluntary measures (like signing 287(g)
agreements deputizing local police to enforce immigration laws) and involuntary
measures (threatening to defund jurisdictions with so-called “sanctuary” laws).
What has been the “Trump Effect” on subfederal governments’ immigration poli-
cies? We define the Trump Effect as the influence that Trump’s immigration poli-
cies have had on the immigration policies of states, cities, and counties. Have they
fallen in line with the federal push for restrictive policies and increased enforce-
ment, or have they resisted? Using our unique Immigrant Climate Index (ICI), we
track the response of cities, counties, and states by analyzing the immigration-
related laws they enacted in 2017—the first year of the Trump administration—and
comparing it to previous years’ activity. Based on our data, we make several obser-
vations. First, subfederal governments have responded with surprising speed and in
unprecedented numbers to enact laws that are almost uniformly pro-immigrant. In
response to increased federal enforcement, these subfederal governments have
enacted “sanctuary” laws limiting their cooperation with federal immigration
enforcement. Most of these laws were enacted by cities and counties, which enacted
more immigration regulations in this one year than they enacted during the pre-
vious twelve years combined (2005–16).
Second, in the context of historical ICI scores, these immigrant-protective laws
helped to pull the national ICI score sharply upward. By assigning scores (positive
or negative) to each subfederal immigration law, our ICI has tracked the climate
for immigrants on a state-by-state basis and identified distinct phases in subfederal
immigration regulation since 2005. Though the national ICI score (where indi-
vidual state scores are added together, through time) remains highly negative, we
observe a distinct Trump effect in 2017: Immigrant-protective laws enacted by cer-
tain jurisdictions are creating more positive climates for immigrants in those
jurisdictions.
† Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law; A.B., Harvard College,
J.D., Harvard Law School.
‡ Professor, Department of Economics, Baylor University; S.B. and S.M., M.I.T.;
Ph.D. Economics, Cornell University. We are grateful to Ming Chen, Shannon Gleeson,
and Carrie Rosenbaum who kindly read earlier drafts of this paper and offered very
helpful comments. We are also indebted to our super hardworking team of research assis-
tants: Elizabeth Anderson, Maddie Churchman, Ryan Kinkade, Emma Martin, and Daniel
Weinstein. Copyright © 2019 by Huyen Pham & Pham Hoang Van.
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Finally, the nature of governmental sanctuary in 2017 was distinctly more diverse
than the sanctuary we have seen in decades past. In 2017, big urban cities were not
the most active sanctuary cities, as was the case in past years; rather, medium-sized
cities and suburbs with populations under 100,000 prevailed. Though most of these
smaller jurisdictions voted for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election, a
surprising number voted for Trump. Moreover, new sanctuary entities have
emerged—including public school districts, public universities, and even mass
transit authorities—which have limited their own cooperation with federal immi-
gration enforcement. This diversity in government sanctuary reflects another aspect
of the Trump Effect: how harsh immigration enforcement policies under this
administration have made immigration issues much more important to a wider
range of communities and to a larger range of policy areas.
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INTRODUCTION
The impact of the Trump administration on the nation’s immigra-
tion policy has been profound. Since the first year of his administra-
tion, President Donald Trump has implemented restrictive policies on
multiple immigration fronts. Through executive orders, executive
actions, and agency memoranda, President Trump issued directions to
halt admissions from certain majority-Muslim countries,1 significantly
decrease refugee admissions,2 end Temporary Protective Status (TPS)
1 Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 8978 § 3(c) (Jan. 27, 2017) (banning entry
to the United States for citizens of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen).
2 Id. at 8989 § 5(d) (lowering the number of refugees to be admitted into the United
States in 2017 to 50,000).
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for Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Sudanese,3 and terminate the Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program.4
Perhaps most consequentially, the administration’s enforcement
of federal immigration laws has been undertaken with special zeal. As
the chief executive, President Trump has used his enforcement discre-
tion to enlarge the pool of removable immigrants,5 expand the places
where they are arrested for removal,6 and short-circuit the administra-
tive process by which many are removed.7 The result: record high
arrests of immigrants without criminal records,8 with arrests occurring
in areas conventionally thought to be off-limits to immigration
3 Temporary Protected Status Designated Country: Haiti, USCIS, https://www.uscis.
gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status/temporary-protected-status-designated-
country-haiti (last visited Nov. 8, 2018); Temporary Protected Status Designated Country:
Nicaragua , USCIS, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status/
temporary-protected-status-designated-country-nicaragua (last visited Nov. 8, 2018);
Temporary Protected Status Designated Country: Sudan, USCIS, https://www.uscis.gov/
humanitarian/temporary-protected-status/temporary-protected-status-designated-country-
sudan (last visited Nov. 8, 2018).
4 See, e.g., Eliana Johnson, Trump Has Decided to End DACA, with 6-Month Delay,
POLITICO (Sept. 3, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/03/trump-dreamers-
immigration-daca-immigrants-242301 (describing the Trump administration’s decision to
end deferred action for immigrants that unlawfully arrived during their childhood); Brian
Naylor, Trump Ends DACA, Calls on Congress to Act, NPR (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.
npr.org/2017/09/05/546423550/trump-signals-end-to-daca-calls-on-congress-to-act (same).
5 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8800 § 5 (Jan. 25, 2017) (rescinding
removal priorities instituted by the Obama administration that targeted immigrants with
serious criminal histories).
6 See, e.g., Avi Selk, He Dropped His Daughter Off at School. Minutes Later,
Immigration Agents Took Him Away., WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/03/04/he-dropped-his-daughter-off-at-
school-minutes-later-immigration-agents-took-him-away/ (describing the ICE arrest of a
father shortly after dropping his daughter off at school).
7 See Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017) (expanding the
application of expedited removal, which applies to immigrants who cannot prove that they
have lived continuously in the United States for two years before apprehension); see also
Nolan Rappaport, What Trump’s “Expedited Removal” Really Means for Immigrants in
US, HILL (Feb. 24, 2017, 5:20 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/immigration/
321102-what-expedited-removal-really-means-for-illegal-immigrants-in (predicting that
expanded expedited removal will place immigrants in a Catch-22 in which they can get
relief from expedited removal by proving they have lived continuously in the United States
for more than two years, but are prohibited by law from making asylum claims if they have
lived in the United States for over a year).
8 See Nick Miroff & Maria Sacchetti, Trump Takes “Shackles” off ICE, Which Is
Slapping Them on Immigrants Who Thought They Were Safe, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-takes-shackles-off-ice-
which-is-slapping-them-on-immigrants-who-thought-they-were-safe/2018/02/11/4bd5c164-
083a-11e8-b48c-b07fea957bd5_story.html (describing the doubling of noncriminal arrests
by ICE in 2017, as compared with 2016).
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enforcement—such as courthouses,9 school areas,10 within the vicinity
of public rallies,11 and even inside hospitals.12
A critical piece of this administration’s enforcement strategy is to
harness the manpower of larger state and local police agencies to help
enforce federal immigration laws. Like previous administrations, the
Trump administration has employed voluntary measures, like signing
287(g) agreements through which state and local law enforcement
officers become deputized to enforce federal immigration laws.13
Unlike previous administrations, however, President Trump has been
relentless in trying to coerce participation from unwilling “sanctuary”
jurisdictions. That coercion has come in the form of lawsuits accusing
these jurisdictions of violating federal law by providing sanctuary to
undocumented persons,14 threats to cut federal funding,15 and
9 See, e.g., Stephen Rex Brown, ICE Courthouse Arrests of Immigrants by ICE Agents
Have Risen 900% in New York This Year: Immigrant Defense Project, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Nov. 15, 2017), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/ice-courthouse-arrests-immigrants-
900-n-y-2017-article-1.3633463 (describing the 900% increase in ICE courthouse arrests in
New York in 2017, with most of the arrests occurring in New York City); Maya Rhodan,
Plainclothes Officers Arrested Immigrants at a Courthouse. Can They Do That?, TIME
(Sept. 18, 2017), http://time.com/4946747/immigration-plainclothes-brooklyn-courthouse/
(describing the arrests of four immigrants outside of a Brooklyn courthouse by ICE
officers who did not identify themselves).
10 See, e.g., Selk, supra note 6.
11 E.g., Samantha Schmidt, ICE Nabs Young “Dreamer” Applicant After She Speaks
Out at a News Conference, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2017/03/02/ice-nabs-young-dreamer-applicant-after-she-speaks-out-
at-a-news-conference/ (recounting the story of ICE officers pulling over and arresting a 22-
year-old “DREAMer” while she was driving home after speaking out at a public rally
against the announcement to end DACA).
12 E.g., John Burnett, Border Patrol Arrests Parents While Infant Awaits Serious
Operation, NPR (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/20/552339976/border-patrol-
arrests-parents-while-infant-awaits-serious-operation (reporting that Border Patrol agents
detained parents of an ill child receiving treatment during a hospital visit).
13 See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement Between U.S. ICE & Bristol Cty. Sheriff’s
Office (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/287gMOA/Bristol_MOA_01182017.pdf;
Memorandum of Agreement Between U.S. ICE & Cape May Cty. Sheriff’s Office (Apr.
10, 2017), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/287gMOA/287gCapeMayNj2017-04-10.pdf;
Memorandum of Agreement Between U.S. ICE & Clay Cty. Sheriff’s Office (June 30,
2017), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/287gMOA/clay-fl-2017.pdf; Memorandum of Agreement
Between U.S. ICE & Nye Cty. Sheriff’s Office (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/
287gMOA/287gNyeCounty2017.pdf.
14 See, e.g., Sarah N. Lynch & Dan Levine, U.S. Justice Department Sues California
Over ‘Sanctuary’ Policies, REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
justice-immigration/u-s-justice-department-sues-california-over-sanctuary-policies-
idUSKCN1GJ07T (reporting that the federal government is suing the state of California
for sanctuary policies protecting illegal immigrants from deportation).
15 See, e.g., Letters from Alan Hanson, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Katherine Sheehan, Mayor, Albany, N.Y.; Jesse Arreguin, Mayor, Berkeley,
Cal.; Debbie O’Malley, Chair, Cty. Comm’n, Bernadillo Cty., N.M.; Miro Weinberger,
Mayor, Burlington, Vt.; Mary Jane Robb, Sheriff, Contra Costa Cty.; Tony Yarber, Mayor,
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targeting immigrants in these jurisdictions with Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) raids.16
How have states, cities, and counties reacted to these aggressively
restrictive federal immigration policies? Have they fallen in line with
the federal push for restrictive policies and increased enforcement, or
have they resisted? Using our unique Immigrant Climate Index (ICI),
we track the response of subfederal governments by analyzing the
immigration-related laws they enacted in 2017—the first year of the
Trump administration—and comparing their ICI scores to previous
years’ activity. The ICI, which tracks subfederal immigration laws
since 2005 and calculates the immigrant climate they have created,
provides a systematic way to observe and understand trends in sub-
federal immigration regulation.
Using historical ICI data, we discern a distinct Trump Effect on
subfederal immigration regulation. For most of the subfederal regula-
tions under study, the Trump Effect is clear, as the laws’ preambles or
legislative history either directly reference Trump policies or a more
restrictive immigration climate generally.17 Based on our data, we
offer three observations about the Trump Effect and its implications.
First, the most visible manifestation of the Trump Effect was the
sharp growth of subfederal immigration regulation in 2017, regulation
that was overwhelmingly pro-immigrant in nature. Much of this
growth occurred at the city and county level; in 2017, cities and coun-
ties enacted more immigration regulations in this single year than was
ever enacted in the previous twelve years added together (2005–16).
These laws are almost uniformly immigrant-protective, focusing on
policing laws that limit the authority of local police to cooperate with
federal immigration enforcement, or laws protecting access to local
Jackson, Miss.; and others (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/
1011571/download.
16 See, e.g., ICE Targeting ‘Sanctuary Jurisdictions’ in Latest Raids, ALL THINGS
CONSIDERED (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/29/554600966/ice-targeting-
sanctuary-jurisdictions-in-latest-raids (discussing ICE’s targeting of sanctuary jurisdictions
in Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Denver, and across the state of Massachusetts); Matt Pearce
& Andrea Castillo, Federal Agents Sweep Nearly 100 7-Eleven Stores in Immigration
Investigation, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-
7-eleven-probe-20180110-story.html (reporting that 7-Elevens nationwide, including in Los
Angeles, were targeted in ICE raids).
17 See, e.g., Coachella City Council, Cal., Res. No. 2017-52 (Aug. 23, 2017) (proclaiming
Coachella, California, as a sanctuary city); River Forest Vill. Bd., Ill., Res. No. 17-15 § 5
(Aug. 21, 2017) (limiting city officials’ ability to stop or arrest individuals based on
immigration detainers or warrants); Albany City Council, Cal., Res. No. 2017-9 (Apr. 17,
2017) (declaring Albany, California, as a sanctuary city); Newark, N.J. Exec. Order No. 17-
0001 (June 19, 2017) (limiting local cooperation with federal immigration authorities).
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services regardless of immigration status.18 The Trump Effect was also
felt at the state level—though in a less dramatic manner—as state leg-
islatures were less active than city and county governments, and more
evenly divided between immigrant-protective laws and immigrant-
restrictive laws.19
Our second observation is that this Trump Effect has pulled the
national ICI score sharply upward. By assigning a positive score to
immigrant-protective laws and a negative score to immigrant-
restrictive laws, our ICI has tracked the climate for immigrants on a
state-by-state basis since 2005. Using this historical data, three dif-
ferent phases in subfederal immigration regulation emerge: Phase I of
intensely negative regulation (2005–12), Phase II showing a small but
consistent uptick in positive regulation (2012–16), and Phase III
reflecting the Trump Effect and the sharp upward turn in the national
ICI score (2017–present). Since its inception, the national ICI score
(where ICI scores for all the states are added together) has been in
negative territory, fueled by restrictive omnibus laws like Arizona’s
Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070).20 Since 2012, however, the national ICI
score has trended upward, and this most recent surge of pro-
immigrant laws helps pull the national score further upward. Though
the 2017 laws were primarily enacted at the city and county levels, and
thus have less influence on ICI scores (versus statewide laws), the
sheer number of laws and their uniformly immigrant-protective nature
have positively influenced the national ICI score. More significantly,
by using their own resources and governmental authority, these juris-
dictions have helped create more protective climates for immigrants
within their communities, although that protection is greatly limited
by the federal government’s supremacy in immigration enforcement.
Our third observation focuses on the changing nature of sanc-
tuary. In 2017, not only did the number of sanctuary governments
18 See, e.g., SPOKANE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 18.07.020 (2017) (restricting the ability of
employees of the city to inquire about immigration status); Oxnard City Council, Cal., Res.
No. 15,046 (July 25, 2017) (prohibiting city agencies from entering into enforcement
agreements with ICE); Windham Town Council, Conn., Res. No. 2694 (Jan. 17, 2017)
(prohibiting local personnel from cooperating with immigration enforcement agencies);
Bd. of Comm’rs for Multnomah Cty., Or., Res. No. 2016-132 (Dec. 22, 2016) (declaring
Multnomah County a sanctuary county); York, Pa. Exec. Order (Jan. 24, 2017) (ensuring
access to city services and benefits regardless of immigration status).
19 E.g., California Values Act, S. 54, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (restricting
law enforcement cooperation with federal immigration authorities for certain
misdemeanors but not for serious or violent felonies); S. 4, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex.
2017) (prohibiting local entities and campus police forces from adopting policies
prohibiting or materially limiting enforcement of immigration laws).
20 S. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (declaring “attrition through
enforcement” the public policy of Arizona).
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increase, but these governments created more diverse concepts of
“sanctuary.” During Phases I and II, sanctuary governments tended to
be larger cities, with populations of over 100,000, as well as
Democratic voting patterns. In contrast, the most active sanctuary
governments in 2017 were smaller cities and suburbs, with populations
between 50,000 and 100,000 people; though most of these smaller
jurisdictions voted for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential elec-
tion, a surprising number voted for Trump. Finally, new types of gov-
ernmental actors engaged in the immigration debate as school
districts, universities, and even transit authorities issued policies lim-
iting their cooperation with federal immigration enforcement.21 This
diversity in government sanctuary shows how immigration enforce-
ment issues have become more important to a wider range of commu-
nities and to a larger range of policy areas.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides the historical
and legal framework to understand subfederal immigration regulation
generally and the most recent surge of regulation specifically. This
Part introduces our Immigrant Climate Index and uses the ICI as an
analytical tool to understand the three distinct phases of subfederal
immigration regulation. Part II describes the Trump Effect in detail.
We start with an overview of the Trump administration’s markedly
more aggressive immigration policies, and then analyze the substance
of the resulting laws enacted by states, cities, and counties during
2017. In Part III, we zoom out and consider the broader implications
of this Trump Effect. Using our historical ICI data, we give context to
this latest phase and offer a framework for thinking about the future
of subfederal immigration regulation.
I
UNDERSTANDING SUBFEDERAL IMMIGRATION
REGULATION
A. The Immigrant Climate Index
To understand the full implications of the Trump Effect, it is cru-
cial to understand the historical background of subfederal immigra-
21 See, e.g., North Shore Sch. Dist., Ill., Res. Declaring District 112 a Safe Haven School
District (Mar. 21, 2017) (forbidding employees from disclosing a student’s immigration
status unless required by law); Indianapolis Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, Ind., Res. No. 7736 (Feb.
23, 2017) (limiting employees to cooperate with immigration enforcement efforts only
where required by law and with permission from superintendent); Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., Iowa, Res. No. 17-019 (Feb. 7, 2017) (requiring all ICE requests to access
school information or grounds to be funneled to the superintendent); Davis Joint Unified
Sch. Dist., Cal., Res. No. 37-17 (May 4, 2017) (requiring written notice before the entry of
any federal immigration officials onto school property).
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tion regulation generally. To that end, the ICI provides a unique
measure of the climate created by subfederal immigration regulations
on a state-by-state basis.22 The ICI collects and analyzes subfederal
immigration laws, assigning numerical scores based on the effect and
scope of the laws and calculating scores by state over time. With data
collection starting in 2005—the first year with significant subfederal
immigration regulation—the ICI provides parameters to understand
the immediate Trump Effect on subfederal immigration regulation
and the historical context to interpret the significance of that effect.
In constructing the ICI, we include regulations enacted by cities,
counties, and states that specifically affect immigrants within their
jurisdictions. With this definition, we are less concerned with the legal
form of the regulation (e.g., whether it is styled as a law, an ordinance,
a policy, or a resolution) and more concerned with its effect: Does it
concretely affect the lives of immigrants, either in a positive or nega-
tive way? For our larger ICI project, we are interested in measuring
how subfederal laws affect the daily lives of immigrants within their
jurisdictions. For this Article, the focus on policy effect is crucial in
measuring how the Trump administration’s immigration policies affect
subfederal immigration policies. While subfederal governments often
pass resolutions expressing support for or opposition to some immi-
gration policy or principle, such as increased federal immigration
enforcement, these resolutions do not change how the subfederal gov-
ernments actually operate.
To separate immigration regulation from subfederal regulation
generally, we look for a specific effect on immigrants that differs from
any possible effect on nonimmigrants. Often, the link to immigrants is
clear, as the regulation singles out immigrants in its text (e.g., granting
or denying a benefit based on immigration status).23 Occasionally, the
22 See Huyen Pham & Pham Hoang Van, Measuring the Climate for Immigrants: A
State-by-State Analysis, in STRANGE NEIGHBORS: THE ROLE OF STATES IN IMMIGRATION
POLICY (Gabriel J. Chin & Carissa B. Hessick eds., 2014); Huyen Pham & Pham Hoang
Van, State-Created Immigration Climates and Domestic Migration, 38 U. HAW. L. REV. 181
(2016).
23 E.g., DENVER, COLO., REV. MUN. CODE ch. 28, art. VIII, § 28-250(a)(3) (2017)
(forbidding the conditioning of public services on immigration or citizenship status); OAK
PARK, ILL., VILLAGE CODE ch. 13, art. 7, § 4 (2017) (disallowing the conditioning of village
benefits, opportunities, or services on citizenship or immigration status); ROCKVILLE, MD.,
CITY CODE ch. 11, art. 1, § 11-3(e) (2017) (barring city officials for discriminating on the
basis of citizenship or immigration status); SALEM, MASS., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art.
XVII, § 2-2062(a) (2017) (stating that city services must be available to all regardless of
country of origin unless prohibited by law); River Forest Vill. Bd., Ill., Res. No. 17-15 § 5
(Aug. 21, 2017) (banning city employees from conditioning services based on immigration
status unless required by law); West Palm Beach City Comm’n, Fla., Res. No. 112-17 § 5
(Mar. 27, 2017) (forbidding the conditioning of public services on immigration or
citizenship status unless required by law).
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regulation does not mention immigrants or immigration at all but has
a disproportionate effect on immigrants (e.g., laws requiring or
prohibiting the translation of government documents into other lan-
guages).24 Because of its disproportionate effect, this kind of regula-
tion would be classified as a subfederal immigration regulation.
The laws used in order to build the ICI come from several
sources, with collection starting in 2005. To collect state laws, we
looked to the immigration-related legislation collected by the
National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL)25 and, using our
definition of subfederal immigration regulation, filtered out laws that
did not have a concrete effect on immigrants’ lives. We supplemented
the NCSL data with our own news searches, to capture state-level
laws not enacted by legislatures (e.g., an executive order issued by a
governor).
Collecting city and county laws was more complicated given that
no central clearinghouse exists for this type of local legislation. For
our ICI, city and county laws were compiled from a variety of sources,
including data collected by advocacy groups,26 government websites,27
and searches of electronic news databases.28 For each law found, we
contacted the local governmental entity to confirm that the law had
been enacted, the date of enactment, and the substance of the law;
whenever possible, we obtained a copy of the enacted law. If our
research indicated that the law was rescinded (because of litigation or
other reasons), we marked the year of rescission in our database and
adjusted our ICI calculations to reflect the rescission. If a single law
contains several different provisions, we consider each provision sepa-
24 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 120B.115(a)(7) (2014) (stating that regional centers of
excellence may aid in the translation of district documents and must work to close the
achievement gap between different types of English learners); Santa Fe City Council,
N.M., Res. No. 2017-19 (8) (Feb. 22, 2017) (committing the city to improving language
access to city services and programs).
25 About Us, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/aboutus.aspx (last
visited Nov. 4, 2018).
26 See, e.g., LATINO JUST. PRLDEF, http://latinojustice.org (last visited Nov. 4, 2018);
MEXICAN AM. LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, http://maldef.org (last visited Nov. 4, 2018);
NAT’L DAY LABORER ORGANIZING NETWORK, http://www.ndlon.org/en/ (last visited Nov.
4, 2018); OHIO JOBS & JUST. PAC, http://www.ojjpac.org (last visited Nov. 4, 2018).
27 See Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality
Act, U.S. ICE, https://www.ice.gov/287g (last updated Aug. 10, 2018). One means by which
ICE enforces federal immigration laws is through 287(g) agreements, partnerships with
state or local law enforcement agencies wherein those agencies partnering with ICE are
delegated authority to enforce immigration laws within their respective jurisdictions. The
ICE 287(g) website includes basic descriptions and requirements of 287(g) agreements and
lists each participating entity.
28 See Westlaw News Headlines, REUTERS (2018), https://www.reuters.com/news/
archive/westLaw.
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rately and include all provisions that meet our substantive criteria in
our calculations.
Because immigration regulations will vary in their effect, it is not
an accurate reflection of the subfederal climate to simply count the
laws enacted in states. To reflect that varying effect, we considered
both a law’s type and its geographic range when calculating its ICI
score. Which laws have more impact? In his influential model,
Abraham Maslow posited that humans are motivated to fulfill basic
needs first (physiological needs, like food and shelter, and safety
needs, like security and freedom from fear) before being able to fulfill
growth needs (like relationships, esteem, and self-actualization).29 For
immigrants, research applying Maslow’s hierarchy suggests that immi-
grants are pushed to focus on their basic needs first, regardless of the
personality development level they reached before immigrating.30
Incorporating that research, we divided the laws into four basic
types, assigning scores (or “tiers”) of 1 to 4, with higher points for laws
that have more impact on immigrants’ lives (either positive or nega-
tive). Tier 4 laws are policing laws that affect the physical security of
immigrants by either increasing deportation risk (e.g., a 287(g) agree-
ment that deputizes local law enforcement officers to enforce immi-
gration laws31) or decreasing that risk (e.g., a “sanctuary law” that
prohibits the use of subfederal resources to enforce immigration
laws32). Tier 3 includes laws that affect access to the very important
benefits that cannot be replaced or are only replaced at high personal
cost. Tier 3 includes laws that affect access to general employment or
driver’s licenses. An example of a negative Tier 3 law would be a regu-
lation requiring public contractors to certify that all of their workers
have legal work authorization;33 an example of a positive Tier 3 law
29 Seymour Adler, Maslow’s Need Hierarchy and the Adjustment of Immigrants, INT’L
MIGRATION REV., Winter 1977, at 444.
30 Id.
31 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
32 See, e.g., DENVER, COLO., REV. MUN. CODE ch. 28, art. VIII, § 28-250(a) (2017)
(barring any city funds or resources to assist federal immigration enforcement); NEWTON,
MASS., REV. ORDINANCES, ch. 2, art. VI, § 2-405 (2017) (disallowing city funds from being
used to assist federal immigration enforcement); ITHACA, N.Y., MUN. CODE ch. 215, art.
VI, § 215-44 (2017) (forbidding city resources from aiding any federal program requiring
registration of individuals on the basis of their national origin); Santa Monica City Council,
Cal., Res. Embracing Diversity and Clarifying the City’s Role in Enforcing Federal
Immigration Law (Feb. 28, 2017) (forbidding the use of city resources to detain or register
individuals based solely on their noncompliance with civil provisions of federal
immigration law); Honolulu City Council, Haw., Res. No. 17-50, CD1 (Apr. 26, 2017)
(requesting that no county funds be expended to aid ICE).
33 See, e.g., TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.072(b) (West 2017) (requiring the Texas
Railroad Commission to “not award a contract for goods or services in this state to a
contractor unless the contractor and any subcontractor register with and participate in the
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would be a regulation granting driver’s licenses regardless of immigra-
tion status.34
In our ICI, Tier 2 laws affect access to benefits that are important
but can be more easily replaced. Examples include a law requiring
proof of legal immigration status to obtain publicly funded health-
care35 or a law granting in-state college tuition rates to undocumented
students.36 Another common Tier 2 law limits access to a specific job
(e.g., license to be an insurance agent) based on immigration status.
All of these benefits are important but, because alternatives exist, we
assign two points to laws that limit or increase access to these benefits.
Finally, Tier 1 encompasses laws that affect immigrants’ lives in a con-
crete—albeit less significant—way. For example, laws requiring or
prohibiting the translation of government documents into a secondary
language are assigned one point, either positive or negative.37
In calculating ICI scores, we also weigh laws differently
depending on their geographic reach. Statewide laws are assigned
whole points (from 1 to 4 points, depending on their tier). City and
county laws, however, receive fractional points, weighted to represent
their more limited jurisdiction as compared with state laws. For
example, when Las Vegas signed a 287(g) agreement in 2008,38 the
negative four points that the 287(g) agreement would usually receive
E-verify program to verify employee information”); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN.
§ 223.051(b) (West 2017) (stating that the Texas Department of Transportation “may not
award a contract for the construction, maintenance, or improvement of a highway” to a
contractor unless that contractor and any subcontractor is registered with and participating
in E-verify).
34 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926(v) (West 2018) (including “National Origin” as
discrimination for the basis of possessing a driver’s license granted under Section 12801.9
of the Vehicle Code); CAL. VEH. CODE § 12801.9(a) (West 2018) (stating that the
Department of Motor Vehicles shall issue a driver’s license to a person who is unable to
submit satisfactory proof of authorized presence in the United States if he or she meets all
other qualifications for getting a license and provides satisfactory proof to the DMV of his
or her identity and California residency); D.C. CODE § 50-1401.05(a) (2018) (declaring
emergency status and amending previous legislation to allow individuals who have been
previously assigned a SSN but can no longer establish legal presence in the United States
to obtain a limited purpose driver’s license, permit, or identification).
35 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2903.03(A) (2011) (requiring applicants
applying for health benefits to provide documentation of citizenship or qualified alien
status).
36 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 23-7-103(2)(o) (2018) (allowing undocumented
immigrants to be classified as in-state students if the primary purpose behind their
Colorado residence is not their education or that of a family member); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 10a-29(9) (2018) (allowing undocumented immigrants to receive in-state tuition for
Connecticut universities if certain conditions are met).
37 See supra note 24.
38 See Memorandum of Agreement Between U.S. ICE & Las Vegas Metro. Police
Dep’t (Sept. 8, 2008), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/287gMOA/287goldlasvegasmpd.pdf.
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under the tier system was reduced to reflect the city’s smaller popula-
tion, as compared with the larger Nevada population:
1,951,269 (population of Las Vegas metropolitan area)
÷ 2,700,551 (population of Nevada)
× -4 tier points
= -2.89 points
B. The Phases of Modern Subfederal Immigration Regulation
We developed the ICI, in large part, to measure the growth and
direction of subfederal immigration regulation. With an understanding
of the ICI’s construction and its data, we provide a richer, more
nuanced history of subfederal immigration regulation. We emphasize
the modern development of this phenomenon and, for reasons
explained more fully below, we focus our analysis on subfederal regu-
lation after the 9/11 attacks. Using national, cumulative ICI data, we
identify three phases in this modern era of subfederal immigration
regulation: Phase I, which includes intensely negative regulation
(2005–12); Phase II, which shows a small but consistent uptick in posi-
tive regulation (2013–16); and Phase III, which reflects the Trump
Effect, an increase in positive laws as well as changes in the types of
local governments enacting these laws (2017). These phases become
apparent when the national ICI score (a sum of individual states’
scores) is viewed over time.39
39 See infra Figure 1.
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FIGURE 1. NATIONAL ICI SCORES
National ICI Scores (2005–17)
In choosing a modern focus, we recognize that the history of sub-
federal immigration regulation in the United States is longer and
more complex than what is discussed in this Article. States and local
governments have long enacted laws that would qualify as subfederal
immigration regulation under our definition. In this country’s early
history, dating as far back as the colonial period, states regulated the
entry of immigrants who landed at their ports.40 Since then, states
have tried to enact subfederal immigration laws regulating the distri-
bution of benefits like education and healthcare based on immigration
status; the most restrictive of these laws have been struck down on
preemption and other constitutional grounds.41
Yet even against this history, the subfederal immigration regula-
tion that we have seen in the twenty-first century is unique. We trace
40 See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law
(1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1841 (1993) (noting that several colonies attempted
to pass restrictive immigration legislation in response to the immigration of English
persons convicted of crimes).
41 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down a state law that denied K–12
education to undocumented children on equal protection grounds); Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365 (1971) (invalidating state laws that denied welfare benefits to legal immigrant
residents, holding that the laws were preempted by federal law and violated the equal
protection clause).
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the beginning of this regulation to the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Before
those attacks, the federal government’s position was that it had the
exclusive authority to enforce civil immigration laws; subfederal gov-
ernments, according to this view, only had legal authority to prosecute
criminal immigration laws.42 But after the 9/11 attacks, when the
hijackers were determined to be Saudi nationals here on student and
other temporary visas, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued an
invitation to subfederal law enforcement agencies, asking them to
become partners in enforcing federal immigration laws, both civil and
criminal.43 Using their “inherent authority” as sovereigns, Ashcroft
argued that states could also enforce civil immigration laws (e.g., laws
prohibiting visa overstays).44
The initial response was muted, as subfederal governments
expressed reluctance to entangle themselves with immigration law
enforcement. But with continued federal encouragement and national
security concerns as a convenient foil, subfederal governments soon
jumped into the legislative fray. According to the tracking done
through our ICI and the National Conference of State Legislatures,
subfederal governments at the city, county, and state level started
enacting immigration laws in measurably higher numbers in 2005.45
During Phase I, most of these laws were restrictive in nature, limiting
the rights and benefits available to immigrants within the subfederal
jurisdictions. In enacting these restrictive laws, subfederal govern-
ments cited frustration with the federal government’s inability or
unwillingness to enforce federal immigration laws, as well as the
growing national security concerns in light of the 9/11 attacks.46 Cities
42 See Assistance by State & Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens, 20 Op.
O.L.C. 26, 27 (1996), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/1996/02/31/op-
olc-v020-p0026.pdf (opining that local police may enforce criminal but not civil provisions
of the Immigration & Nationality Act); see also Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding
“Sanctuary Cities,” 59 B.C. L. REV. 1703, 1720–21 (2018) (tracing the entanglement of
immigration and criminal law enforcement to Reagan’s War on Drugs that criminalized
many drug offenses and thus increased the grounds for deportation).
43 John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney Gen., Prepared Remarks on the National Security
Entry-Exit Registration System (June 6, 2002), http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/
2002/060502agpreparedremarks.htm.
44 Id.
45 See infra Figure 2. In 2005, the National Conference of State Legislatures started
compiling reports on immigration-related laws in 2005; before that year, state laws related
to immigration were few in number and largely limited to the state distribution of social
service benefits. E-mail from Ann Morse, Program Dir., Immigrant Policy Project, Nat’l
Conference of State Legislatures, to Huyen Pham, Professor of Law, Tex. A&M Univ. Sch.
of Law (Aug. 12, 2009, 11:57 EST) (on file with authors).
46 See Dan Nowicki, Arizona Immigration Law Ripples Through History, U.S. Politics,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC (July 25, 2010), http://archive.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/
2010/07/25/20100725immigration-law-history-politics.html (blaming the Clinton and
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like Hazleton, Pennsylvania, and Farmers Branch, Texas, enacted
ordinances that restricted the ability of undocumented immigrants to
rent housing, work, or obtain any public benefit within city limits.47
FIGURE 2. LOCAL LAWS AND STATE LAWS
Local Laws (first column) and State Laws (second column) (2005–12)
At the state level, states like Colorado and Georgia passed simi-
larly comprehensive laws that required proof of lawful status for most
state benefits, verification of work eligibility for state contractors’
employees, and authorization for the states to enter into 287(g) agree-
ments with ICE.48 During Phase I, a smattering of subfederal jurisdic-
tions enacted positive laws but, as shown in Figure 2, the majority of
laws were restrictive. Moreover, though local governments were ini-
tially active during Phase I, they were quickly outpaced by state
governments.49
Obama administrations’ lack of immigration reform as the motivation for passing stricter
state immigration laws).
47 Federal courts struck down these provisions on preemption grounds. Lozano v. City
of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers
Branch, 726 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2013).
48 H.R. 1017, 65th Gen. Assemb., 1st Spec. Sess. (Colo. 2006) (requiring employers to
verify legal work status of all new employees); H.R. 1023, 65th Gen. Assemb., 1st Spec.
Sess. (Colo. 2006) (mandating that a resident be either a lawful permanent resident or a
citizen to receive public benefits); S. 529, 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006) (authorizing the
state to enter into 287(g) agreements with the Department of Justice; requiring public
employers as well as contractors and subcontractors performing services within the state
for a public employer to use E-Verify for all new employees; requiring certain private
employers to use E-Verify for new full-time employees; and mandating that recipients of
state benefits prove lawful immigration presence).
49 See supra Figure 2.
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In this sea of restrictive laws, the legislative activity of Arizona
deserves special analysis. Starting in 2007, Arizona enacted the first of
many negative immigration laws; furthermore, the types of restrictive
laws enacted were predominantly of the most important type—Tier 4
policing-type laws that harness the power of local law enforcement
agencies or otherwise impose criminal penalties to discourage illegal
immigration. Because of the volume and restrictive nature of its immi-
gration laws, Arizona has had the most negative ICI score among all
the states, a “distinction” that continued into 2017. Not surprisingly
then, Arizona gained a national reputation in the immigration debate,
praised in some circles for taking a tough stance against illegal immi-
gration, and condemned in others for embracing anti-immigrant and
anti-Hispanic sentiment.50
Several other significant consequences flow from Arizona’s legis-
lative activity. First, the legal challenges to its restrictive laws have
resulted in two Supreme Court decisions which are part of the modern
framework for permissible subfederal immigration regulation. The
earlier decision, Chamber of Commerce of the United States v.
Whiting,51 upheld the Legal Arizona Workers Act, which authorized
state courts to suspend or revoke the business license of an employer
who intentionally or knowingly employs an “unauthorized alien.”52
The Act also required all employers within the state to use E-Verify, a
federal program that verifies the work eligibility of individual appli-
cants.53 In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that federal law did not pre-
empt either of these provisions.54 Specifically, the Court pointed to a
provision in the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act which
prohibits all state or local regulation of employer sanctions “other
than through licensing and similar laws.”55 This clause, the majority
held, saved Arizona’s law from an express preemption challenge;
looking more generally at Congress’s legislative scheme for employer
50 Compare Kris W. Kobach, The Arizona Immigration Law: What It Actually Does,
and Why It Is Constitutional (Oct. 1, 2010), in 1173 HERITAGE LECTURES (Heritage
Found., Washington, D.C.), Dec. 3, 2010, at 6, https://www.heritage.org/immigration/report/
the-arizona-immigration-law-what-it-actually-does-and-why-it-constitutional (arguing that
the Arizona law is “simply trying to help the federal government restore the rule of law”),
with Alex Lach, The Top 5 Reasons Why S.B. 1070 Damages America, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (June 25, 2012, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/
news/2012/06/25/11785/the-top-5-reasons-why-s-b-1070-damages-america/ (arguing that the
Arizona laws institutionalize racial profiling by allowing police to target people of color or
those with a foreign accent).
51 563 U.S. 583 (2011).
52 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-212, 23-212.01 (2010).
53 Id.
54 Whiting, 563 U.S. at 611.
55 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2018).
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sanctions, the majority also found no conflict preemption.56 This 2011
decision was widely understood to open the way for subfederal regula-
tion of immigration employment.
Arizona v. United States,57 the latter and more consequential law-
suit, involved a challenge to several provisions of Arizona’s Senate
Bill 1070 (SB 1070). The challenged provisions of SB 1070 (1) made
unlawful presence in the United States a state crime, (2) made
working or seeking work without lawful work authorization a state
crime, (3) authorized local and warrantless arrests of immigrants
believed to be removable from the United States, and (4) required
state and local officers to verify the immigration status of anyone law-
fully arrested or detained.58 All provisions but the verification provi-
sion were struck down on preemption grounds.59
As precedent, Arizona v. United States reasserted a strong federal
role in immigration enforcement and drew limits for subfederal gov-
ernments interested in immigration regulation. While the decision
gave a semi-green light to subfederal enforcement of federal immigra-
tion laws, the decision also halted two popular types of subfederal
immigration regulation: laws which create state-level crimes to punish
for immigration offenses, and laws giving more immigration enforce-
ment authority to state and local officers than is available to federal
immigration officers.60 The issuance of Arizona v. United States in
2012 also marks the end of Phase I. As noted earlier, this phase was
characterized by highly restrictive legislative activity, bringing the
national cumulative ICI score down to the negative 800s by 2012.61
By 2013, however, the national ICI score started ticking upward;
to be sure, the cumulative national score remained highly negative,
but the upward trend is discernible. Looking at the subfederal legisla-
tive activity during Phase II (2013–16), we note that there were both
increases in positive legislation (mostly at the state level) and
decreases in negative legislation. In fact, 2013 marks the first year of
the ICI index in which more positive laws were enacted than negative
laws.62 Why were there fewer negative laws in Phase II? The simplest
explanation may be that subfederal governments inclined to enact
restrictive laws had already done so by 2012; moreover, the Supreme
56 Whiting, 563 U.S. at 587.
57 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
58 Id. at 394.
59 Id. at 416.
60 Id. at 408.
61 See supra Figure 1.
62 See infra Figure 3.
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Court’s decision in Arizona v. United States put the brakes on several
popular types of restrictive laws.
FIGURE 3. POSITIVE VS. NEGATIVE LAW
Positive vs. Negative Law (2005–16)
Understanding the uptick in positive laws during Phase II is more
complex. We start by delving into the details of the upward trend. For
the most part, the positivity did not come from cities and counties,
which remained relatively quiet from 2012–16. They enacted fewer
laws during this period, almost evenly balanced between positive and
restrictive laws.63 Rather, much of the upward trend can be attributed
to the legislative actions of states, which enacted more positive laws
than negative laws.64
63 See infra Figure 4.
64 See infra Figure 4.
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FIGURE 4. LOCAL LAWS AND STATE LAWS
Local Laws (first column) and State Laws (second column) (2005–16)
California leads the states in this positive trend; in the same way
that Arizona has come to symbolize restrictive immigration laws and
anti-immigrant sentiment, California has become the public represen-
tation for positive and pro-immigration legislation.65 In 2013,
California enacted the California TRUST Act, a law that prohibits all
state and local law enforcement agencies from honoring ICE detainer
requests unless the detained immigrant has been charged or convicted
of a serious offense.66 During Phase II, detainer requests were gener-
ated through Secure Communities, an information-sharing program
that automatically notified ICE if an immigrant of interest was
booked in a local jail.67 With that notification, ICE could ask the local
law enforcement agency to detain the immigrant for an additional
65 See Melanie Mason, California Gives Immigrants Here Illegally Unprecedented
Rights, Benefits, Protections, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/
california/la-me-california-immigrant-rights-20150811-story.html (explaining the array of
state policies that give rights to immigrants in California, covering healthcare, higher
education, and protection from federal immigration enforcement); Jazmine Ulloa,
California Becomes “Sanctuary State” in Rebuke of Trump Immigration Policy, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 5, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-brown-california-sanctuary-state-
bill-20171005-story.html (reporting the passage of SB 54, making California a “sanctuary
state” despite legal challenge and backlash from the Trump administration); see also Dean
Kuipers, How California Is Resisting Trump’s Immigration Policies, NEWSWEEK (May 2,
2017), http://www.newsweek.com/california-resisting-trump-immigration-policies-593379
(noting that in addition to its pro-immigrant laws, California residents are actively building
“longer-term organizing power and infrastructure” to ensure that the state is a sanctuary
state both in name and in practice).
66 California TRUST Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7282.5 (West 2018).
67 See infra note 70.
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forty-eight hours beyond the time the individual would ordinarily be
released, to give ICE time to pick up and place the individual in
removal proceedings.68 With its TRUST Act, California eliminated
one of the most valuable tools for federal-subfederal cooperation in
immigration enforcement. Other active states during Phase II
included Illinois, Minnesota, and Washington, enacting largely
immigrant-protective laws.69
Why were more immigrant-protective laws enacted during Phase
II? Like the subfederal governments that acted during Phase I, the
states active during Phase II were motivated to act by perceived short-
comings in federal immigration policy. But during Phase II, states
acted based on their perception of enforcement excesses committed by
the Obama administration. Secure Communities, for example, was
promoted as a way to remove dangerous immigrants, but multiple
audits found that the program was removing large numbers of immi-
grants with no or very minor criminal records.70 The removal of these
sympathetic immigrants, with the resulting disruption to families and
their communities, made the program extremely unpopular among
immigration advocates and in other circles.71
68 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2011).
69 See, e.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2013 IMMIGRATION
REPORT – ENACTED LAWS AND RESOLUTIONS BY STATE (2013), http://www.ncsl.org/
documents/statefed/2013enacted_Finalbystate.pdf; NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, 2014 IMMIGRATION REPORT – ENACTED LAWS AND RESOLUTIONS BY
STATE 7–9, 11, 17 (2014), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/immig/2014_Immig_Laws_by_
State.pdf.
70 See WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INTERIOR IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT: CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAMS 1 (2016) (noting that immigration advocacy
groups criticized Secure Communities for removing large numbers of undocumented
immigrants who had committed minor or nonviolent crimes); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-708, SECURE COMMUNITIES: CRIMINAL ALIEN
REMOVALS INCREASED, BUT TECHNOLOGY PLANNING IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED (2012)
(reporting that of the forty-four percent of alien Secure Communities removals on whom
ICE collected arrest charge data, traffic offenses were the most frequent charges); see also
Secure Communities, U.S. ICE, https://www.ice.gov/secure-communities (last visited Nov.
9, 2018) (advertising Secure Communities as simply a way to carry out ICE’s law
enforcement priorities for aliens in custody of state or local law enforcement).
71 See 287(g) Agreements, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/287g-agreements (last
visited Nov. 9, 2018) (noting the ACLU’s opposition to 287(g) agreements, because they
lead to racial profiling and civil rights abuses); The 287(g) Program: An Overview, AM.
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/
research/287g-program-immigration (highlighting that the 287(g) program has led to a host
of problems, including damaging the relationship between police and local communities,
and not focusing on serious criminals). The legal liability that some local police
departments faced for honoring the detainer requests also increased opposition to the
program. Laurence Benenson, The Trouble with Immigration Detainers , NAT’L
IMMIGRATION F. (May 24, 2016), http://immigrationforum.org/blog/the-trouble-with-
immigration-detainers/#_edn45.
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Thus, at the end of 2016 and President Obama’s second term, the
national ICI score was still starkly negative but showing a discernible
uptick in positive legislation, led by states like California. 2017
marked the start of the Trump administration and a distinctly different
phase in subfederal immigration regulation.
II
WHAT IS THE TRUMP EFFECT?
During the first year of his term, President Trump imposed signif-
icant restrictions on the nation’s immigration policies, moving aggres-
sively to reduce legal immigration and increase interior enforcement
targeted at illegal immigration. Our ICI data show that these restric-
tive immigration policies at the federal level had a significant effect on
immigration policies at the subfederal level, changing the way that
states, cities, and counties regulated immigrants within their own juris-
dictions. In this Part, we analyze the Trump Effect, starting with an
overview of the restrictive federal immigration policies motivating
action at the subfederal level. Then, we describe the changes during
this Phase III of subfederal immigration regulation.
A. Trump’s Immigration Policies as Catalyst
Though the Trump administration has changed the country’s
immigration policies on many fronts, our review here focuses on the
policy changes that have spurred subfederal governments to change
their own immigration regulations. Those federal policy changes are
of two types: the administration’s use of federal resources to enforce
federal immigration laws, and its efforts to harness the enforcement
power of state and local police in that immigration enforcement.
As the chief executive, President Trump has used his enforcement
discretion to aggressively enforce federal immigration law. In the
administration’s most impactful enforcement action, the Department
of Homeland Security rescinded enforcement priorities put into place
by the Obama administration, priorities that focused federal immigra-
tion enforcement on dangerous criminals and recent arrivals.72 With
this rescission, all unauthorized immigrants, even those with no or
minor criminal histories, are now priorities for enforcement.73 Almost
daily, the media reports on the heart-wrenching deportation of immi-
grants who have lived in the United States for many years, established
72 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
73 Id. (directing agencies to enforce the immigration laws of the United States against
“all enforceable aliens”).
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successful careers, and leave behind U.S. citizen family members as a
result of this rescission.74
Besides expanding who should be targeted for enforcement, the
administration has also expanded where enforcement actions take
place. Immigrants during the Trump era have been arrested at court-
houses,75 near schools,76 after a public rally,77 and even inside hospi-
tals.78 Though ICE maintains that a sensitive locations policy remains
in effect, which should limit immigration enforcement actions in these
areas,79 it is clear that the Trump administration conducts immigration
enforcement actions in areas previously thought to be off-limits. ICE
arrests at courthouses raise special concerns, as critics argue that the
arrests threaten public safety by deterring victims and witnesses to
crimes from coming forth, and discouraging immigrants charged with
low-level crimes from showing up for court appearances.80
The administration has also changed how many immigrants are
removed by expanding the application of expedited removal. Through
this process, removal can be ordered by low-level immigration
officers, entirely circumventing the hearings provided by the immigra-
tion courts and all associated administrative and judicial appeals.81 On
January 25, 2017, as part of his Border Security and Immigration
Enforcement Improvements Executive Order, President Trump
74 See, e.g., Christina Caron, Michigan Father Deported After Living in U.S. for 30
Years, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/16/us/man-deported-
jorge-garcia.html; Alejandro Lazo, After 20 Years in the U.S., Indiana Restaurant Owner Is
Deported, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5, 2017) https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-20-years-in-u-s-
indiana-restaurant-owner-is-deported-1491443231.
75 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 9; Rhodan, supra note 9.
76 See, e.g., Selk, supra note 6.
77 E.g., Schmidt, supra note 11.
78 E.g., Burnett, supra note 12.
79 FAQ on Sensitive Locations and Courthouse Arrests, U.S. ICE, https://www.ice.gov/
ero/enforcement/sensitive-loc (last visited Nov. 10, 2018) (noting that a sensitive locations
policy is still in place, which includes schools, medical treatment facilities, places of
worship, religious or civil ceremonies, and public demonstrations).
80 See Kaelyn Forde, “Where Can Anyone Seek Justice?”: Experts Warn ICE
Courthouse Arrests May Mean Witnesses, Victims Won’t Show Up, ABC NEWS (July 27,
2018), https://abcnews.go.com/US/seek-justice-experts-warn-ice-courthouse-arrests-
witnesses/story?id=56756506; Ce´sar Cuauhte´moc Garcı´a Herna´ndez, ICE’s Courthouse
Arrests Undercut Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
11/26/opinion/immigration-ice-courthouse-trump.html.
81 See AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL ET AL., PRACTICE ADVISORY: EXPEDITED
REMOVAL: WHAT HAS CHANGED SINCE EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 13767, BORDER
SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IMPROVEMENTS (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.
americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/final_expedited_
removal_advisory-_updated_2-21-17.pdf (defining expedited removal as a procedure,
which allows a Department of Homeland Security officer to arrest and deport an
individual on the same day without a hearing before an immigration judge or review by the
Board of Immigration Appeals).
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announced his intent to expand expedited removal to include a new
group: immigrants who cannot prove that they have lived continu-
ously in the United States for two years before apprehension.82
Though this expansion is permitted by federal law, it has never been
invoked by past presidents.83
In addition to deploying federal resources to enforce immigration
laws, the Trump administration has also moved aggressively to harness
the enforcement power of state and local police. Like Presidents
Barack Obama and George W. Bush, President Trump has used
various tools to piggyback on the larger enforcement presence of local
and state police in order to multiply the federal immigration power.
But the Trump administration does so in ways that are markedly more
aggressive than previous administrations. In brief, President Trump
has expanded the use of both voluntary measures that depend on sub-
federal jurisdictions’ willing cooperation, as well as involuntary meas-
ures that try to force resisting jurisdictions into participation.
On the voluntary front, the Trump administration has reinvigo-
rated the 287(g) program, whereby local and state police agree to be
deputized to enforce immigration laws.84 Following through on cam-
paign promises, President Trump increased the number of agreements
signed with local law enforcement agencies, signing seventeen new
agreements in Texas alone.85 He has also promised to restore a more
aggressive form of the agreements, the “task force” model that would
allow deputized local officers to enforce immigration laws on the
streets, as well as in jails.86
82 Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8796 (Jan. 25, 2017); Memorandum from
John Kelly, U.S. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., Implementing the President’s Border Security
and Immigration Enforcement Improvements Policies (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing-the-Presidents-Border-Security-
Immigration-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf.
83 See Rappaport, supra note 7.
84 See Mica Rosenberg & Reade Levinson, Police in Trump-Supporting Towns Aid
Immigration Officials in Crackdown, REUTERS (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-trump-effect-immigration-police/police-in-trump-supporting-towns-aid-
immigration-officials-in-crackdown-idUSKBN1DR169.
85 Lisa Maria Garza, Trump Administration Reaches Deal with Texas Counties on
Immigration , REUTERS (July 31, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
immigration-texas/trump-administration-reaches-deal-with-texas-counties-on-immigration-
idUSKBN1AG2H7. One of the eighteen agreements cited in this article, signed by the
Lubbock County Sheriff’s Office, was actually signed in 2016 by the Obama
administration. Kathryn Casteel, While Some Communities Become Sanctuaries, Others
Are Happy To Help With Trump’s Immigration Crackdown, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 10,
2017), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/while-some-communities-become-sanctuaries-
others-are-happy-to-help-with-trumps-immigration-crackdown/.
86 See Garza, supra note 85.
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The administration also resurrected the Secure Communities pro-
gram, an information-sharing program through which ICE is automat-
ically notified if an individual of interest is booked into a local jail.87 If
ICE wants to place the individual in removal proceedings, it may ask
the local law enforcement agency to detain the immigrant beyond the
immigrant’s release date for ICE pickup.88 Formerly, in response to
successful legal challenges,89 the Obama administration largely elimi-
nated the detainer requests, asking in most instances that local author-
ities merely notify ICE of the immigrant’s release date.90 In 2014,
President Obama suspended the controversial program altogether,
though many of its functions were carried out by the successor
Priorities Enforcement Program.91 In reinstating Secure
Communities, President Trump restored the ICE practice of placing
detainer holds on all immigrants of interest.92
In a marked departure from previous administrations, President
Trump has also relentlessly extracted participation from unwilling
jurisdictions. Using the dual threats of federal funding cuts and
targeted ICE raids, the Trump administration has targeted so-called
“sanctuary cities,” or jurisdictions that refuse to fully cooperate with
federal immigration enforcement. In his Executive Order on interior
enforcement, President Trump accused these jurisdictions of “willfully
violat[ing] Federal law in an attempt to shield aliens from removal
from the United States,” and directed the Secretary of Homeland
Security and the Attorney General to prevent these jurisdictions from
receiving federal grants.93 In 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions
warned sanctuary jurisdictions that they are breaking federal law by
87 See Secure Communities, supra note 70.
88 Immigration Detainers, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrants-rights/ice-and-
border-patrol-abuses/immigration-detainers (last visited Nov. 24, 2018).
89 See, e.g., Jessica M. Vaughan, ICE Policy Change on Detainers Fuels Lawsuits to
Obstruct Enforcement, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Apr. 23, 2014), https://cis.org/Vaughan/
ICE-Policy-Change-Detainers-Fuels-Lawsuits-Obstruct-Enforcement (reporting on a
federal judge in Oregon ruling that local law enforcement officials need not honor ICE
detainers).
90 See Elise Foley, Immigration Official Walks Back Support for Mandating that Police
Hold Immigrants, HUFFPOST (Mar. 19, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/19/
immigration-detainers_n_6904240.html (describing the decreased use of detainers and
instead asking law enforcement to notify the agency if it was set to release someone who fit
the deportation priorities).
91 See id. (describing the transition from Secure Communities to the Priorities
Enforcement Program (PEP)).
92 See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017) (directing the
Secretary to terminate PEP and reinstate Secure Communities); Secure Communities,
supra note 70 (describing Secure Communities, its reinstatement, and the subsequent
effect).
93 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017).
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not cooperating with federal agents and threatened them with the loss
of specific federal law enforcement grants.94
The defunding threats have had both intended and unintended
results. Facing the possibility of losing federal funding, some jurisdic-
tions have in fact rescinded their policies limiting immigration cooper-
ation. The mayor of Miami-Dade County, for example, immediately
instructed county jails to comply with all detainer requests issued by
ICE, abandoning the county’s previous policy of only honoring
detainer requests when the federal government reimbursed the deten-
tion costs.95 But other jurisdictions quickly filed lawsuits to block any
federal defunding efforts, arguing that the federal threats violate con-
stitutional limits on federal power. Separate lawsuits were filed at
various subfederal levels: the state of California,96 the towns of
Chelsea and Lawrence (Massachusetts),97 the cities of Seattle,
Portland,98 Chicago,99 and San Francisco, and the county of Santa
Clara.100
Beyond defunding threats, the Trump administration has also
tried to undermine sanctuary cities by conducting enforcement raids
in their jurisdictions. In October 2017, ICE targeted ten sanctuary
94 See Carlos Ballesteros, Trump and Jeff Sessions Are Going After More Sanctuary
Cities, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 15, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/sanctuary-cities-trump-
sessions-department-justice-712965 (describing the noncompliance warning sent out by
Sessions to twenty-nine cities, counties, and states); Overview of Legal Requirements
Generally Applicable to OJP Grants and Cooperative Agreements - FY 2017 Awards, OFF.
JUST. PROGRAMS, https://ojp.gov/funding/Explore/SolicitationRequirements/index.htm
(last visited Nov. 5, 2018) (setting out express conditions related to federal immigration
enforcement cooperation for certain grants).
95 Samantha Schmidt, As Major “Sanctuary Cities” Resist Trump’s Threats, Miami-
Dade Mayor Says City Will Comply, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/01/27/as-major-sanctuary-cities-resist-
trumps-threats-miami-mayor-says-city-will-comply/.
96 Dan Levine, California Sues Trump Administration Over Sanctuary Policy, REUTERS
(Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-sanctuary/california-
sues-trump-administration-over-sanctuary-policy-idUSKCN1AU1TI.
97 Milton J. Valencia, Chelsea, Lawrence Challenge Trump on Sanctuary Cities, BOS.
GLOBE (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/02/08/chelsea-lawrence-
sue-trump-over-sanctuary-city-penalties/tXbFN0dM6Wy88gHEjwxdYO/story.html.
98 Maxine Bernstein, Federal Judge Denies Trump’s Motion to Dismiss Seattle, Portland
Sanctuary Cities Case, OREGONLIVE (Oct. 19, 2017), http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/
index.ssf/2017/10/federal_judge_wont_dismiss_sea.html.
99 Sandhya Somashekhar, Chicago Sues Justice Department over New Police Grant
Rules Targeting Sanctuary Cities, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/08/07/chicago-to-sue-justice-department-over-new-police-
grant-rules-targeting-sanctuary-cities/?utm_term=.90e3f1afd945.
100 Bernstein, supra note 98.
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jurisdictions during a four-day sweep, arresting 498 immigrants.101
Those jurisdictions included Baltimore, Chicago, Denver, Los
Angeles, New York, Portland, Philadelphia, Washington D.C., Santa
Clara County (California), and Massachusetts.102 The administration
explicitly tied the decision to conduct these raids to the sanctuary poli-
cies in these jurisdictions. In a statement, ICE acting director Tom
Homan said that “[s]anctuary jurisdictions that do not honor detainers
or allow us access to jails and prisons are shielding criminal aliens
from immigration enforcement and creating a magnet for illegal immi-
gration. . . . As a result, ICE is forced to dedicate more resources to
conduct at-large arrests in these communities.”103
In our analysis, these aggressive enforcement policies motivate
many subfederal jurisdictions to change their own immigration regula-
tions, either in protective or restrictive ways. For protective laws, the
connection with Trump’s immigration policies is sometimes explicitly
stated in the laws themselves. For example, in explaining its reasons
for enacting immigrant-protective laws, Bernalillo County, New
Mexico, stated in the preamble to its Administrative Resolution 2017-
22:
[S]ince the election of a new National leadership there has been a
sense of uncertainty and fear among many communities in
Bernalillo County, across our State, and across the Nation; and . . .
recent Presidential Executive Orders related to immigration
enforcement have done nothing to allay those fears, and in fact con-
tain directives that threaten to lead to family separation, endanger
refugees fleeing violence and persecution, strip immigrants of their
due process, and discriminate against the Muslim community . . . .104
Similarly, the city of Honolulu, in enacting its Haven of Aloha
resolution, cited to “the 2016 national elections . . . [that] introduced
themes, statements, and concepts reflective of a world view fraught
with intolerance, prejudice, and fear” and that “the outcome of these
national elections now raises the prospect that those same themes of
intolerance, prejudice, and fear could find their ways into the laws and
policies of our government; and such an outcome is contrary to the
101 Miriam Jordan, Immigration Agents Arrest Hundreds in Sweep of Sanctuary Cities,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/us/ice-arrests-sanctuary-
cities.html.
102 ICE Arrests 101 People in LA Immigration Sweep, CBS L.A. (Sept. 28, 2017), http://
losangeles.cbslocal.com/2017/09/28/ice-arrests-immigration-sweep/.
103 ICE Arrests Over 450 on Federal Immigration Charges During Operation ‘Safe City,’
U.S. ICE (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-arrests-over-450-federal-
immigration-charges-during-operation-safe-city.
104 Bernalillo Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, N.M., Admin. Res. No. 2017-22 (Mar. 14, 2017).
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core values of our society . . . .”105 These laws demonstrate the span of
the Trump Effect.
Other protective laws in our analysis do not explicitly refer to
President Trump or his administration but, studied in context, also evi-
dence a reaction to his immigration policies. These laws refer more
generally to their community values and their purposes in passing
these laws. For example, Gary, Indiana, passed a resolution to recog-
nize the “present and historic importance of immigrants to our com-
munity,” to demonstrate the city’s “commitment to ensur[ing] public
safety for all city residents and specifically enabl[ing] immigrants to
report crimes” and to “defend the human rights of immigrants and
assure that each person is treated equally regardless of their immigra-
tion status.”106 Similarly, in enacting its sanctuary policies, the city of
Hudson, New York, described itself as a city that “values the social,
cultural and economic contributions that have been made by immi-
grants,” and its police department as having “long determined that it
will give full priority to public safety and justice concerns in prefer-
ence to rigid enforcement of immigration regulations.”107
The motivations cited by these protective laws, together with the
timing of their enactment (during the first year of the Trump presi-
dency), provide strong evidence that they were enacted in response to
the administration’s immigration policies and thus should be consid-
ered part of the Trump Effect. The enforcement policies under
President Trump, which have been previously discussed, are markedly
more aggressive than those of previous administrations.108 This shift in
enforcement policies, together with his other immigration policies,
have caused critics to accuse President Trump of being racist and anti-
immigrant;109 with that context, the connection between Trump’s
immigration policies and protective immigration regulations that draw
upon principles of immigrant equality and nondiscrimination becomes
clearer.
105 Honolulu City Council, Haw., Res. No. 17-50, CD1 (Apr. 26, 2017).
106 Gary, Ind., Ordinance 9100 (May 22, 2017).
107 Hudson Common Council, N.Y., Res. No. 5 (Mar. 21, 2017).
108 See supra notes 72–103 and accompanying text (detailing the various aspects of
Trump’s immigration enforcement policies and how they often diverge from previous
administrations).
109 See, e.g., Steve Holland, Trump Says “I’m Not a Racist,” Keeps Door Open for
DACA Deal , REUTERS (Jan. 14, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
immigration-trump-racism/trump-says-im-not-a-racist-keeps-door-open-for-daca-deal-
idUSKBN1F403G (describing criticism of Trump’s characterization of some immigrants);
David Leonhardt & Ian Prasad Philbrick, Donald Trump’s Racism: The Definitive List,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/15/opinion/
leonhardt-trump-racist.html (compiling a list of Trump’s racist comments).
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On the restrictive side, these new laws provide a less explicit con-
nection to Trump. But the substance of these laws, as explained in
more detail below, demonstrates that they are reactions to immigra-
tion policies either initiated or intensified by the Trump administra-
tion. One important category of restrictive laws includes the new
287(g) agreements in 2017, responding to President Trump’s directives
to significantly expand the program.110 At least some local law
enforcement agencies who signed new agreements were motivated by
their perception that the Trump administration would take tougher
enforcement positions in implementing the program. For example, in
signing a new 287(g) agreement in 2017, Sheriff A.J. Louderback of
Jackson County, Texas, cited to changing federal immigration priori-
ties as motivation: “[T]here is tremendous interest right now in coop-
erating with the federal government under this administration in order
to reduce the risk for our citizens from criminal aliens.”111
Another important category during Phase III was anti-sanctuary
laws enacted at the state level, restricting the authority of cities and
counties to enact immigrant-protective laws like restricting coopera-
tion with federal immigration enforcement. In signing Senate Bill 4,
Texas Governor Greg Abbott emphasized the need for law and order.
“Texas has now banned ‘sanctuary cities’ in the Lone Star State,” he
said. “Now let’s be clear, the reason why so many people come to
America is because we are a nation of laws. And Texas is doing its
part to keep it that way.”112 Though the issue of sanctuary certainly
existed before the Trump administration, the administration brought
this issue to the forefront with its aggressive actions to force coopera-
tion from non-willing subfederal jurisdictions.113 Thus, the immigrant-
restrictive laws are also traceable to the administration’s immigration
policies and can be considered part of the Trump Effect as well.
B. How Phase III Is Different
This section analyzes in detail the substance of the laws enacted
in 2017 and explains the differences that make Phase III distinct in
110 Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8795 (Jan. 25, 2017) (commanding the
Secretary of Homeland Security to enter into 287(g) agreements); Exec. Order No. 13,768,
82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8800 (Jan. 25, 2017) (same).
111 Daniel Gonza´lez, Trump Will Need Local Police to Help Carry Out Deportation
Orders. Will They Comply?, AZCENTRAL (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.azcentral.com/story/
news/politics/immigration/2017/02/02/president-donald-trump-deportation-executive-
order-police/97297342/.
112 Kolten Parker, Without Notice, Texas Governor Greg Abbott Signs “Sanctuary
Cities” Ban Live on Facebook, TEX. OBSERVER (May 7, 2017), https://www.texasobserver.
org/without-notice-texas-governor-greg-abbott-signs-sanctuary-cities-ban-facebook-live/.
113 See supra notes 85–86, 93–95 and accompanying text.
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subfederal immigration regulation. Using the ICI, significantly more
legislative activity appears at the subfederal level than ever seen
before. Combined, states, cities, and counties enacted over 600 laws in
2017, the highest number of laws of subfederal immigration laws ever
enacted in a single year. For purposes of comparison, 99 laws were
enacted in 2016, and the second highest yearly total occurred in 2007
(early Phase I), when 199 laws were enacted at all subfederal levels of
government.114
FIGURE 5. TOTAL SUBFEDERAL LAWS ENACTED
Total Subfederal Laws Enacted (2005–17)
Drilling down, the ICI shows that approximately ninety percent
of the 2017 laws were immigrant-protective in nature. Many of these
laws were “sanctuary” laws, where subfederal governments limited
the authority of their law enforcement agencies to cooperate with fed-
eral immigration enforcement. The law enacted by Denver is a typical
sanctuary law, which lays out that the city values its immigrant
residents, recognizes and upholds various provisions of the United
States Constitution, and creates provisions protecting immigrant citi-
zens, though it carves out exceptions by including language such as
“except to the extent required by any federal, state, or city law or
regulation.”115 As part of its pro-immigrant approach, the Denver law
also includes a provision pledging to distribute city services and bene-
fits without regard for the immigration status of recipients.116
114 See infra Figure 5.
115 DENVER, COLO., REV. MUN. CODE ch. 28, art. VIII (2017).
116 Id.
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State legislatures have also sought to limit cooperation with fed-
eral immigration enforcement. Besides California, Illinois enacted its
version of a TRUST Act, prohibiting its law enforcement agencies and
officials from stopping, arresting, or detaining individuals solely based
on immigration status, or detaining individuals based on an immigra-
tion detainer.117 But beyond policing laws, protective state laws cov-
ered more legislative ground, reflecting the broader powers that states
have vis-a`-vis cities and counties. For example, Oregon now provides
free reproductive health services to all Oregon women, regardless of
immigration status.118 Through its Assembly Bill 324, Nevada places
advertising and other restrictions on document preparers, to prevent
them from misrepresenting themselves as immigration attorneys or
working with immigration attorneys.119
The remaining ten percent of subfederal laws enacted in 2017
were immigrant-restrictive in nature, either imposing restrictions on
immigrants or supporting federal efforts to do so. At the city or
county level, the restrictive laws were almost exclusively new 287(g)
agreements. In 2017, the Trump administration signed twenty-five
agreements, all with sheriff’s departments throughout the United
States.120 These new agreements are part of the administration’s push
to expand the 287(g) program, both as a way to harness the enforce-
ment power of cooperating jurisdictions and to blunt the impact of
noncooperating jurisdictions.121 As of December 2017, thirty-eight
additional jurisdictions have expressed interest in joining the 287(g)
program.122 Unlike previous years tracked by the ICI, we did not
observe cities and counties in 2017 enacting other types of restrictive
laws (e.g., limiting their local benefits to residents with lawful immi-
gration status).
Like state protective laws, state restrictive laws enacted in 2017
covered more legislative ground than their city and county counter-
parts. Several states passed laws restricting the implementation of
117 S. 31, 100th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2017).
118 H.R. 3391, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2017) (mandating provision of a suite of
reproductive health services to all enrollees in private health benefit plans, without any
mention of citizenship status).
119 A.B. 324, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2017).
120 Huyen Pham, 287(g) Agreements in the Trump Era, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1253,
1274 (2018).
121 See id. at 21–34 (explaining how the 287(g) agreements under Trump delegate
federal powers to subfederal actors and do so more aggressively than under previous
administrations).
122 Kanyakrit Vongkiatkajorn, How the Trump Administration is Using Local Cops to
Widen Its Immigration Dragnet, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.motherjones.
com/politics/2017/12/how-the-trump-administration-is-using-local-cops-to-widen-its-
immigration-dragnet/.
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sanctuary laws in their jurisdictions: Indiana Senate Bill 423,123
Mississippi Senate Bill 2710,124 and Texas Senate Bill 4125 all restrict
local governments and universities, while Georgia House Bill 37126
restricts private colleges. States also passed a handful of other policing
laws that, among other things, enhance a criminal sentence for immi-
gration violations127 and require all child abuse offenders to provide
immigration status when registering in the state’s sex offender reg-
istry.128 Beyond policing laws, other restrictive bills at the state level
are more typical of the laws seen in previous years, denying benefits
like government employment,129 social welfare assistance,130 or in-
state college tuition based on immigration status.131
Figure 6 shows the breakdown of protective and restrictive laws
enacted in 2017.
FIGURE 6. TOTAL POSITIVE VS. NEGATIVE LAWS
Total Positive vs. Negative Laws (2005–17)
The final distinguishing characteristic of Phase III is the very
intense level of legislative activity from cities and counties. All across
the country, thirty-nine different states, cities, and counties have
123 S. 423, 120th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2017).
124 S. 2710, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2017).
125 S. 4, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017).
126 H.R. 37, 2017–18 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2017).
127 H.R. 1041, 110th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2017) (inserting “illegal[ ] or unlawful[ ]”
presence in the U.S. at the time of offense in the state’s list of sentence-enhancing factors).
128 H.R. 149, 2017 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2017) (requiring that alien offenders provide
documents establishing their immigration status).
129 H.R. 1534, 29th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2017).
130 S. 222, 2017 Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2017).
131 S. 531, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017).
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enacted more than 500 different laws. To give context, states during
that same year enacted less than 150 laws. Thus, cities and counties
are central to our analysis of the Trump Effect.
What kind of laws are cities and counties enacting? In 2017, the
overwhelming majority of local laws, approximately eighty-eight per-
cent, were immigrant protective in nature.132 Most of these laws fol-
lowed the sanctuary model analyzed earlier, limiting police
cooperation with federal immigration authorities; some jurisdictions
also pledged to distribute their locally-controlled benefits without
regard for immigration status.133 Have cities and counties always been
this active in subfederal immigration regulation? Using ICI data, the
answer is clearly no. In 2017, cities and counties enacted more laws in
this single year than they enacted during the previous twelve years
combined (2005–16).
This high level of local activity naturally leads to this question:
Why are cities and counties becoming more active in immigration reg-
ulation? The answer, we suggest, lies in the Trump Effect. That is,
cities and counties are reacting to this administration’s immigration
policies, with its emphasis on enforcement and restriction, by enacting
laws that either support or limit the impact of the federal policies. As
previously noted, many of the laws, particularly the immigrant-
protective ones, express a connection to the Trump administration’s
policies, either directly or indirectly.134
On one level, the speed with which cities and counties have
reacted to changes in federal immigration policy is not surprising.
Because they have smaller and less cumbersome forms of governing
(e.g., city councils versus larger state legislatures), they are able to
reach consensus more easily and act on that consensus more quickly.
We saw a similar, albeit smaller, trend in the very early years of Phase
I, when immigrant-restrictive laws were the norm. In 2006, cities and
counties took the lead in enacting restrictive laws that, among other
things, denied local benefits on the basis of immigration status, com-
mitted local law agency resources through 287(g) agreements, and
made English the official language.135 States quickly caught up, how-
ever, and in 2007, outpaced local governments, both in the number of
132 Huyen Pham & Pham Hoang Van, Immigrant Climate Index Data (Oct. 29, 2018)
[hereinafter ICI Data] (unpublished data) (on file with authors and New York University
Law Review).
133 See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
134 See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text.
135 ICI Data, supra note 132.
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restrictive laws and in the total number of immigration laws
enacted.136
Figure 7 below shows the number of laws enacted by local gov-
ernments (versus by states) and the breakdown of immigrant-
protective and immigrant-restrictive laws enacted by each from 2005
to 2017.
FIGURE 7. LOCAL LAWS AND STATE LAWS
Local Laws (first column) and State Laws (second column) (2005–17)
III
UNDERSTANDING THE TRUMP EFFECT:
CONTEXT AND ANALYSIS
With detailed information about the size, content, and contours
of the Trump Effect, we turn now to analyzing its implications. Several
observations emerge. First, with the benefit of our ICI data, we see
that the Trump Effect is a distinctly larger escalation of a positive
trend in subfederal immigration regulation that started in 2012. This
section explores the significance of this positive trend. Building upon
our analysis of the Trump Effect, we also analyze the changing nature
of sanctuary in Phase III. We see more variety in the subfederal juris-
dictions offering sanctuary, including diverse population size, political
orientation, and even types of governmental entities participating. We
conclude by offering some thoughts about the future of subfederal
immigration regulation, incorporating our previous observations.
136 Id.
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A. More Positive Immigration Climates
In Phase III, the national ICI score shows a sharp uptick. Though
it remains in very negative territory, the national score is clearly
trending upward. In this section, we analyze likely outcomes if this
trend continues and the implications for immigrants living in these dif-
ferent jurisdictions.
As an initial matter, it is very unlikely that the determinants cur-
rently pushing the national ICI score upward will be enough to push
the score into positive territory in the near future. As previously dis-
cussed, those determinants in Phase III have been a flurry of
immigrant-protective laws enacted by cities and counties, and by the
State of California.137 As to the first determinant, the positive effect of
protective laws enacted at the city and county level would struggle to
overcome the negative ICI effect of restrictive state laws enacted
during Phase I and II. As explained earlier, the ICI assigns less weight
to laws enacted at the city and county level, giving them a score that
represents that local government’s proportion of the overall state’s
population.138 This recalibration occurs because city and county laws,
by definition, have much more limited jurisdiction and thus less effect
on immigration climate than statewide laws.
For example, in 2017, Newburgh, New York, enacted six
immigrant-protective laws that severely restricted the ability of its
police and other municipal agencies to cooperate with federal immi-
gration law enforcement. Specifically, these laws prohibit the
Newburgh Police Department from entering into a 287(g) agreement,
engaging in joint operations with ICE, honoring ICE detainer
requests without a warrant, or releasing immigration data to ICE or
other government agencies except under limited circumstances.139
Additionally, the laws prohibit the police department or any city
agents from inquiring into the immigration status of city residents they
encounter and prohibit ICE access to municipal facilities without a
warrant.140 Because these laws are so comprehensive in protecting
immigrants, we might expect that the laws would have a large impact
on New York State’s ICI score. Yet, because the laws only affect local
government actions in the city of Newburgh (population 30,303),141
137 See supra notes 115–19 and accompanying text.
138 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
139 Newburgh City Council, N.Y., Res. No. 71-2017 (Mar. 13, 2017).
140 Id.
141 Newburgh Town, Orange County, New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: AM.
FACTFINDER, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml (last
visited Oct. 30, 2018).
41136-nyu_94-1 Sheet No. 82 Side A      04/08/2019   11:46:01
41136-nyu_94-1 Sheet No. 82 Side A      04/08/2019   11:46:01
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-1\NYU103.txt unknown Seq: 35  2-APR-19 15:30
April 2019] SUBFEDERAL IMMIGRATION REGULATION 159
they only contribute 0.0375 positive points to the state’s ICI score.142
By comparison, Executive Order 170, signed by Governor Andrew
Cuomo to limit the authority of state agencies (including state law
enforcement agencies) from inquiring about immigration status or
releasing immigration information to federal authorities,143 adds a full
eight points to New York State’s score. The higher points assigned to
the governor’s executive order reflects its broader influence: All
employees of state agencies within the State of New York (population
19,378,102)144 are bound by this order.
On the restrictive side, during Phase III, seventeen counties in
Texas signed 287(g) agreements. Within their individual jurisdictions,
each agreement could have a tremendous effect, as 287(g) agreements
have been shown to significantly increase the number of immigrants
detected and placed into removal proceedings.145 However, the com-
bined effect of these agreements on Texas’s ICI score must reflect the
limited influence of these countywide agreements, decreasing them to
just 0.5073 points each.146 By contrast, Senate Bill 4 (SB 4), enacted by
the Texas legislature in 2017, decreases the state’s ICI score by twelve
full points. SB 4, as previously discussed, requires all law enforcement
agencies, including campus police departments, to comply with all fed-
eral immigration detainer requests, and prohibits them from enacting
any rules or policies which would restrict or even discourage immigra-
tion law enforcement.147 For offending law enforcement agencies and
agency heads, the penalties include substantial fines, removal from
office, and even personal criminal liability.148
Thus, if immigrant-protective laws continue to be enacted almost
exclusively by cities and counties, even if enacted in high numbers, the
ICI will most likely remain negative. If more states besides California
enact immigrant-protective laws, then the ICI score could turn posi-
142 The calculation is as follows: (30,303/19,378,102 (New York state population)) *4
(police law) *6 (6 different laws) = 0.0375.
143 N.Y. Exec. Order No. 170 (Sept. 15, 2017).
144 New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: AM. FACTFINDER, https://factfinder.census.gov/
faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).
145 RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., DELEGATION AND DIVERGENCE: A
STUDY OF 287(G) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 18 (2011), https://www.
migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-divergence.pdf (describing the “substantial number” of
removals identified through the 287(g) program).
146 The calculation is as follows: the sum of [(county population/Texas population) *-4
(police law)] for each county signing a 287(g) agreement.
147 See S. 4, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017). For ICI purposes, we count SB 4 as having
three separate provisions: (1) requiring law enforcement agencies to honor all ICE
detainer requests, (2) requiring university police to honor all ICE detainer requests, and
(3) prohibiting the use of state government resources to discourage immigration
enforcement.
148 See id.
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tive. We saw this kind of “trickle-up” activity in Phase I, as cities and
counties initially took the lead in enacting restrictive laws, followed by
states quickly taking over and outpacing local governments in
enacting more restrictive laws. The national ICI swung in a sharply
negative direction as a result.149
For immigrants living in the United States, a more positive
national ICI score would seem to be a beneficial development, but
there are two limiting realities. First, any benefits would be limited to
the geographical jurisdiction granting the benefit; thus a higher
national ICI score does not benefit an immigrant living in a restrictive
jurisdiction. For example, an immigrant living in California (the state
with the most positive ICI score), would experience many more bene-
fits than a similarly-situated immigrant in Arizona (the state with the
most negative ICI score). Even if she lacks legal immigration status,
the California resident could apply for a state driver’s license150 and
state loans to attend college.151 She also has the peace of mind of
knowing that her employer is prohibited from reporting her to ICE as
retaliation if she engages in legally protected activities—like
demanding payment of wages152—and that her local police depart-
ment is limited in its authority to cooperate with federal immigration
law enforcement.153 Meanwhile, an unauthorized immigrant living in
Arizona is unable to obtain a driver’s license,154 public benefits,155 or
even a liquor license.156 She would also have to worry about the police
checking her legal status at any type of law enforcement stop.157
The very different paths that California and Arizona have taken
on subfederal immigration regulation are reflected in Figure 8 below.
Though other subfederal jurisdictions have not taken the same
extreme paths, the larger point remains true: Whether an individual
immigrant experiences a positive or negative subfederal immigration
climate depends on the laws of his or her particular jurisdiction.
149 See supra Figure 1.
150 See A.B. 1660, 2013–14 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).
151 See S. 1210, 2013–14 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (omitting legal immigration status
from its list of requirements to receive state loans).
152 See A.B. 2751, 2013–14 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).
153 See S. 31, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
154 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28–3153(D) (2010).
155 H.R. 2467, 48th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2007).
156 H.R. 2391, 48th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2007).
157 See S. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
41136-nyu_94-1 Sheet No. 83 Side A      04/08/2019   11:46:01
41136-nyu_94-1 Sheet No. 83 Side A      04/08/2019   11:46:01
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-1\NYU103.txt unknown Seq: 37  2-APR-19 15:30
April 2019] SUBFEDERAL IMMIGRATION REGULATION 161
FIGURE 8. ICI SCORES, CALIFORNIA AND ARIZONA
ICI Scores of California and Arizona (2005–17)
The second limit on a positive ICI score is the reality of very
harsh federal enforcement policies. Even the most immigrant-
protective subfederal government is limited in its ability to stop the
aggressive enforcement of federal immigration policies in its jurisdic-
tion. In these sanctuary jurisdictions, ICE can and likely will continue
to make arrests in sensitive areas, to make every immigrant without
lawful status a priority for removal (regardless of criminal record),
and to expand the application of expedited removal proceedings.158 In
fact, the Trump administration appears to be targeting some sanctuary
cities for immigration raids.159 The legal battles over what subfederal
governments can do to enforce—and resist the enforcement of—fed-
eral immigration laws will continue for the near future.160 But the fed-
eral government controls the levers of the federal immigration
enforcement machine, and because of preemption principles, sub-
federal governments may not enact laws that conflict with or under-
mine federal immigration policies. As the Supreme Court in Arizona
v. United States concluded, “The National Government has significant
power to regulate immigration. . . . Arizona may have understandable
frustrations with the problems caused by illegal immigration . . . but
the State may not pursue policies that undermine federal law.”161
158 See supra notes 66–83 and accompanying text.
159 See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text.
160 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Sessions Targets California Immigrants Using a Ruling That
Protected Them, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/us/
politics/jeff-sessions-california-lawsuit.html (reporting that the Trump administration filed
a lawsuit against California, alleging that California’s sanctuary policies are illegal).
161 567 U.S. 387, 416 (2012).
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B. The Changing Nature of Sanctuary
Phase III was also characterized by more diversity in the nature
of the governments offering sanctuary, as compared with past years.
In this analysis of sanctuary, we focus specifically on policing laws that
limit subfederal cooperation with federal immigration law enforce-
ment, or otherwise offer some protection from that federal enforce-
ment. Though subfederal governments can offer health, educational,
and other benefits to create a welcoming environment for immigrants,
their limits on police cooperation with immigration enforcement also
provide sanctuary or protection from possible removal. This focus on
policing laws is consistent with how other academics, the media, and
even the federal government discuss immigration sanctuary.162
Throughout Phases I and II, the most active sanctuary jurisdic-
tions have been larger cities and counties, with populations of more
than 100,000 people. The convergence between large population cen-
ters and pro-immigrant laws is perhaps not surprising, as cities in the
modern political era have often been associated with large immigrant
communities and more liberal immigrant policies.163 But in 2017,
smaller cities and counties with populations less than 100,000 took the
lead, enacting more sanctuary laws than their larger counterparts.164
This category of smaller cities and counties was more active in 2017
than it had been in all the previous ICI years combined, and outpaced
the larger cities and counties in 2017 by more than forty percent.
162 See, e.g., Lasch et al., supra note 42, at 1704 (describing sanctuary cities as localities
that “have sought to disentangle their criminal justice apparatus from federal immigration
enforcement efforts”); Tal Kopan, Jeff Sessions Takes Immigration Fight to California,
Announces Lawsuit, CNN (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/07/politics/jeff-
sessions-california-sanctuary-cities-lawsuit/index.html (discussing Sessions’ attacks on the
leaders of sanctuary cities as “radical extremists”).
163 See Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, 20 Metro Areas Are Home to Six-in-Ten
Unauthorized Immigrants in U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.
org/fact-tank/2017/02/09/us-metro-areas-unauthorized-immigrants/ (noting that
unauthorized immigrants settle primarily in large metropolitan areas, some of which have
sanctuary policies limiting local police cooperation with immigration enforcement).
164 See infra Figure 9. The crossover actually occurs at the end of 2016, due to the flurry
of sanctuary legislation enacted after President Trump’s election in November 2016. To
simplify analysis, we classified laws by the date of their enactment and limited our analysis
of the Trump Effect to laws enacted in 2017, when President Trump took office.
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FIGURE 9. CITIES AND COUNTIES ENACTING POSITIVE POLICING
LAWS, BY POPULATION
Cities and Counties Enacting Positive Policing Laws, by Population (2005–17)
To be sure, larger cities and counties also became more active in
2017, with sixty-seven enacting immigrant-protective policing laws.
But the bigger surge in activity by smaller cities and counties (ninety-
four) demonstrates that the policy concerns motivating sanctuary
laws165 are now shared by a more diverse group of subfederal jurisdic-
tions, not just the larger urban centers of years past.
In another sign of increased diversity, we note that a sizeable
number of the 2017 sanctuary jurisdictions voted for President Trump
in the 2016 presidential elections. As Figure 10 illustrates, the vast
majority of sanctuary jurisdictions active in Phase III voted for Hillary
Clinton; and if we use a Clinton/Trump vote in 2016 as proxy for
Democratic/Republican political orientation, Democratic jurisdictions
outnumbered Republican jurisdictions in enacting sanctuary laws
during Phases I and II as well.166 Given these historical trends, it is
noteworthy that twenty cities and counties that voted for President
Trump—with his campaign promises of restrictive immigration poli-
cies—also enacted policies protecting immigrants within their jurisdic-
tions. For example, in September 2017, the Deerfield, New Hampshire
Police Department adopted a policy prohibiting its officers from stop-
ping, holding, or interrogating someone solely to determine his or her
165 As noted earlier, those concerns include opposition to the Trump’s aggressive
immigration enforcement policies, support for immigrants living within their communities,
protecting public safety, and supporting equal rights and equal protection. See supra notes
104–07 and accompanying text.
166 In fact, these Republican-voting jurisdictions were largely inactive on the sanctuary
front during Phases I and II, except for a bit of activity in 2014.
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immigration status.167 In November 2016, the city voted for Trump in
the presidential election.168
This political diversity, albeit limited, provides more evidence
that sanctuary concerns motivated by the Trump administration’s
aggressive immigration enforcement policies are becoming more
widespread.
FIGURE 10. JURISDICTIONS ENACTING POSITIVE POLICING LAWS,
BY POLITICAL AFFILIATION
Jurisdictions Enacting Positive Policing Laws, by Political Affiliation (2005–17)
In 2017, we also saw the emergence of new governmental players
in this sanctuary debate: public school districts, public universities,
and even mass transit authorities. During Phase III, these govern-
mental entities issued “safe zone” statements, limiting their coopera-
tion with federal immigration authorities. Public school districts,
which run K–12 classes, were the most active among the new actors,
with thirty-three school districts adopting immigrant-protective poli-
cies. A typical example of a protective school district policy is
Indianapolis Public School Resolution 7736, which prohibits school
district employees from (1) collecting or disseminating information
about a student’s immigration status (or the status of the student’s
family), except as legally required, or (2) assisting with immigration
enforcement efforts unless legally required and authorized by the
167 Melissa Proulx & Mark Hayward, Deerfield PD Adopts New Policy for Dealing with
Illegal Immigrants, N.H. UNION LEADER (Sept. 20, 2017), http://www.unionleader.com/
Deerfield-PD-adopts-new-policy-for-dealing-with-illegal-immigrants.
168 New Hampshire Election Results 2016, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/
elections/results/new-hampshire (last updated Aug. 1, 2017). The vote count was 1091 votes
for Clinton and 1607 votes for Trump.
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school superintendent to do so.169 The resolution also states that its
previous policies against bullying, intimidation, or discrimination also
protect students born outside the United States, or whose first lan-
guage is not English.170
In an era of aggressive federal immigration enforcement, the rea-
sons why school districts adopt immigrant-protective policies are
rooted in their educational mission. The school districts exist to pro-
vide K–12 education to children living in their districts; after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Plyler v. Doe, holding that children who
lack lawful immigration status nonetheless cannot be denied access to
K–12 education based on their status,171 this educational mission evi-
dently extends to immigrant children as well. As a practical matter,
however, the ability to receive an education can be meaningless if chil-
dren and their families fear being picked up by federal immigration
authorities either at school, en route to school, or as a result of a
school connection (e.g., because a school employee alerts ICE to the
student’s status). If this fear takes root and spreads, school district
officials might worry that parents will stop sending their children to
school. If this happens on a large scale, the result might yet be the
creation of a permanent underclass, which Justice Brennan warns
about in Plyler as a compelling reason to recognize immigrant chil-
dren’s constitutional right to education.172
As with other types of sanctuary laws, the impact of the school
district policies may be limited. First, widespread enforcement actions
on school campuses are not likely to occur; schools and school-related
events are still considered to be sensitive locations under the Trump
administration, meaning that enforcement actions should not be
implemented there unless special circumstances exist.173 Second,
school districts do not exercise authority over areas around their
schools, so they would not be able to, for example, protect parents
who are arrested by ICE after dropping their children at school.174
169 Indianapolis Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, Ind., Res. No. 7736 (Feb. 23, 2017).
170 Id.
171 See 457 U.S. 202, 229–30 (1982).
172 Id. at 219–20.
173 ICE’s website states that enforcement actions at sensitive locations may occur if
“there are exigent circumstances, if other law enforcement actions have led officers to a
sensitive location, or with prior approval from an appropriate supervisory official.” ICE
provides no further explanation of what would constitute “exigent circumstances.” FAQ on
Sensitive Locations and Courthouse Arrests, supra note 79.
174 See Carolyn Jones, What It Means When a School District Declares Itself a “Safe
Haven” or “Sanctuary”: A Quick Guide, EDSOURCE (Aug. 10, 2017), https://edsource.org/
2017/what-it-means-when-a-school-district-declares-itself-a-safe-haven-or-sanctuary-a-
quick-guide/584273 (explaining that protective resolutions enacted by school districts are
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The real impact of the school district policies may be more symbolic,
as expressions of support for immigrant students and their families.
Public universities and colleges share the same educational mis-
sion as public school districts regarding the education of immigrant
students, with some key differences. First, because there is no Plyler-
type case for postsecondary education, no legal mandate exists to edu-
cate immigrant children with unauthorized status beyond high school.
Second, colleges and universities tend to attract more attention from
state legislatures, at least on issues related to immigration policy. As
discussed earlier, four state legislatures—Georgia, Mississippi,
Indiana, and Texas—enacted laws during Phase III that prohibited
colleges and universities from enacting sanctuary-type protections.175
These differences, plus the threat of losing federal funding, may
explain why public universities have been more reluctant to embrace
policies limiting their cooperation with federal immigration
enforcement.176
One prominent exception is the California State University
system, which issued guidelines for its twenty-three campuses limiting
the ability of campus police and other university employees to coop-
erate with federal immigration law enforcement. Those guidelines
contain provisions similar to other sanctuary laws: a prohibition
against contacting, detaining, arresting, or questioning individuals
solely based on their immigration status; a prohibition against hon-
oring immigration detainers; and a prohibition against entering into
287(g) agreements.177
Finally, a handful of transit authorities became involved with the
sanctuary debate during Phase III.178 On June 22, 2017, the Bay Area
intended to reassure students and their families that the districts “will do what they can to
keep immigration authorities off school campuses”).
175 See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text.
176 See, e.g., Stephen Dinan, Congress Looks to Punish “Sanctuary Campus” Colleges
That Protect Illegal Immigrants , WASH. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jan/18/congress-looks-punish-sanctuary-campus-colleges/
(describing federal efforts to defund sanctuary campuses and the pushback from those
campuses, including the University of California system); J.B. Wogan, GOP’s “Sanctuary
Campus” Threats Put a Price on Immigrants, GOVERNING (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.
governing.com/topics/education/gov-sanctuary-campuses-trump-immigrants.html
(describing threats made by the state governments of Texas, Arkansas, and Georgia to
defund public universities that establish themselves as sanctuary campuses).
177 See, e.g., Open Letter from Timothy P. White, Chancellor, Cal. State Univ., to the
Faculty, Staff & Students of the Cal. State Univ. (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www2.calstate.edu/
attend/student-services/resources-for-undocumented-students/Documents/Chancellor%20
White%20Letter%20-%20November%2017,%202016.pdf.
178 Other transit authorities with sanctuary policies include the Los Angeles Port Police,
the Los Angeles Airport Police, and the Metro Transit Police Department of the
Minneapolis-St. Paul area. See Los Angeles, Cal. Exec. Directive No. 20 (Mar. 21, 2017),
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Rapid Transit District, a special-purpose district body that operates
the BART rapid transit system in the San Francisco Bay Area,
adopted a Safe Transit policy.179 Unless required by federal or state
law, or a court order, this policy prohibits its employees from using
BART resources to assist in immigration law enforcement, asking
riders about immigration status, disseminating release date informa-
tion about anyone in BART police custody, asking about immigration
status on any BART questionnaire, providing ICE access to anyone in
BART custody, threatening to report riders or others to ICE, asking
for additional documents beyond those required by federal law to
establish eligibility for employment or ridership programs, denying
services based on immigration status, or using the federal E-Verify
program.180 Transit authorities in other cities have stopped short of
adopting formal policies but have issued statements disclaiming any
role in federal immigration law enforcement.181
With these policies and statements, the transit authorities are
trying to reassure their riders and distance themselves from any asso-
ciation with federal immigration law enforcement. In the preamble to
its Safe Transit policy, the BART Board of Directors emphasizes that
it “will continue to stress cooperation with riders based on trust rather
than fear” and “does not have the authority nor the desire to stop or
arrest individuals based on a perceived immigration status.”182 Access
to public transportation is important for all city residents, but particu-
larly so for unauthorized immigrants, who are ineligible for driver’s
https://www.lamayor.org/sites/g/files/wph446/f/page/file/Exec.%20Dir.%20No.%2020—
Standing%20with%20Immigrants.pdf (directive from the Los Angeles mayor directing the
chiefs of the airport and port police to adopt policies prohibiting the investigation of
individuals solely to determine immigration status); Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn. Metro
Transit Police Department, Policy Manual: 428 – Immigration Enforcement, METRO
TRANSIT (2017), https://www.metrotransit.org/transit-police-policy-manual (prohibiting the
Transit Police from taking any law enforcement action for the “sole purpose of detecting
the presence of an undocumented person or persons or to verify immigration status”).
179 Bay Area Rapid Transit Bd. of Dirs., Cal., Safe Transit Policy Res. (June 22, 2017),
https://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2017/news20170622-0.
180 Id.
181 See, e.g., Shelby Bremer, Rumors of Immigration Checks at CTA Stations Are False,
Officials Say, NBC CHI. (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/cta-bag-
checks-chicago-immigration-ice-raids-rumors-413892393.html (describing statements made
by Chicago Transit Authority to quell rumors that it participated in immigration checks at
its stations); Elliot Njus, TriMet Responds to False Rumors of Immigration Raids on Buses,
OREGONIAN (Feb. 10, 2017), http://www.oregonlive.com/commuting/index.ssf/2017/02/
trimet_responds_to_false_rumor.html (describing TriMet’s denial of rumors that federal
immigration officers were targeting bus riders in Portland).
182 Safe Transit Policy Res., supra note 179.
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licenses in most states.183 As with similar sanctuary laws, public transit
authorities can limit their own participation in immigration law
enforcement, but they are unable to stop federal authorities from
enforcing immigration laws on their public premises.184
The emergence of these specialized governmental entities in the
sanctuary debate is significant. Though they have missions wholly dis-
tinct from immigration enforcement, their participation in the immi-
gration debate reflects the encroachment of immigration issues into
these other policy areas. Together with increased diversity in the pro-
file of sanctuary cities and counties, we see the unprecedented reach
of the Trump administration’s immigration policies and the concerns
generated by those policies.
C. The Future of Subfederal Immigration Regulation
This Article has focused on the Trump Effect, analyzing in detail
the influence that this presidency—with its dogged focus on immigra-
tion enforcement and restriction—has had on the immigration policies
of states, cities, and counties. In this section, we offer some thoughts
about the implications of our findings for the future of subfederal
immigration regulation. In doing so, we are not offering predictions,
but rather a framework for thinking about the future trajectory of this
regulatory phenomenon.
First, it is clear that in enacting immigration regulations, states,
cities, and counties are reacting to federal immigration policies, or at
least to their perceptions of those policies. We saw this reaction in
Phase I, when subfederal governments enacted immigrant-restrictive
laws, responding to the perceived lax enforcement policies of the
Obama administration and previous federal administrations. During
Phase III, the pace and scope of subfederal immigration regulation—
and the legislative history of these new laws—also reflect a reaction to
federal policy. Federal immigration policy under the Trump adminis-
tration has been decidedly more restrictive, and our analysis shows
that the most extreme of these policies (e.g., deporting immigrants
without criminal records) seem to garner the most vocal reaction from
subfederal governments, usually in an immigrant-protective direction.
183 See States Offering Driver’s Licenses to Immigrants, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/states-offering-driver-s-licenses-to-
immigrants.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).
184 See Frequently Asked Questions for University Employees About Possible Federal
Immigration Enforcement Actions on University Property, UNIV. CAL. (Mar. 20, 2017),
https://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/content/frequently-asked-questions-federal-
immigration-enforcement-actions (containing guidance from the Regents of the University
of California advising employees that the university cannot prevent ICE from entering
public university property).
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Second, while cities and counties may lead in the initial phase of
subfederal immigration regulation, states matter the most. States con-
trol more resources and have broader geographic reach, so their laws
have the potential to affect immigrants living within their jurisdictions
in a much more impactful way. Our ICI, in its weighing of city and
county laws, reflects that reality. So though many cities and counties
have enacted immigrant-protective laws in this Phase III, helping to
swing the national ICI score upward, state legislative activity will have
the most impact. As we consider the future of subfederal immigration
regulation, we should pay careful attention to what states do. Will
states follow the lead of cities and counties and enact more immigrant-
protective legislation, in the same way that we saw more states enact
restrictive laws during Phase I? Though city and county level laws and
policies are certainly important for immigrants living within their
jurisdictions, the real impact comes at the state level.
The third piece of our framework recognizes that a great majority
of subfederal governments are not involved in immigration regulation
or are only minimally involved. Will more subfederal governments
jump into the legislative fray? Subfederal immigration regulation has
tended to attract those state and local governments that are the most
passionate about immigration issues, either in immigrant-protective or
-restrictive ways. We already saw some significant changes in the pop-
ulation size and political orientation of sanctuary cities. If the Trump
administration continues to implement more and more restrictive
immigration policies, it may inspire yet more subfederal governments
to enact subfederal immigration regulation, making legislation at the
state, city, and county levels even more important in the nation’s
immigration debate.
CONCLUSION
The Trump administration’s immigration policies, with their
hyperaggressive focus on restriction and enforcement, have pro-
foundly affected the immigration policies of states, cities, and coun-
ties. Using our Immigrant Climate Index data, we make three
observations about this Trump Effect. First, subfederal governments,
especially at the city and county level, reacted with a surge of legisla-
tive activity in 2017 that was mostly immigrant-protective in nature—
so called “sanctuary” laws. Second, this surge of positive laws has
helped pull the national ICI score sharply upward. That score remains
in highly negative territory after years of mostly restrictive laws
enacted at the state level, but the high volume of immigrant-protective
laws enacted in 2017 fueled an upward trend that started in 2013.
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Finally, the nature of government sanctuary in 2017 became more
diverse. Compared with the larger, more urban sanctuary cities in
years past, the most active sanctuary cities in 2017 were smaller cities
and suburbs. A surprising number of these smaller jurisdictions voted
for Trump in the 2016 presidential election. Another aspect of sanc-
tuary diversity was the emergence of public school districts, public
universities, and even transit authorities issuing policies limiting their
cooperation with federal immigration enforcement. This increased
diversity in government sanctuary reflects one of the most significant
aspects of the Trump Effect: As the administration continues to
pursue hyperaggressive immigration policies, it is motivating more—
and more diverse—subfederal jurisdictions to enter the immigration
regulation fray.
